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I. INTRODUCTION
Benedetto Varchi (1503–65) was one of the most important and complex
figures in the Italian intellectual landscape of the sixteenth century. His
interests ranged from history to literary criticism, from science to poetry;
yet, until recently, his reputation has been based solely upon his interpreta-
tion of Dante and Petrarch, his discussion of the ‘‘question of the lan-
guage,’’ and his activity generally as a man of letters and pedagogue at the
Accademia Fiorentina.1 Very few studies have sought to reconstruct Var-
chi’s profile as a philosopher, and most that do—by Bruno Nardi, Eugenio
Garin, Cesare Vasoli, and others—have focused on his alleged Averroism.2
1 For an overall account of Varchi’s life, work, and historical context, see Umberto Pirotti,
Benedetto Varchi e la cultura del suo tempo (Florence: Olschki, 1971); and Annalisa
Andreoni, La via della dottrina. Le lezioni accademiche di Benedetto Varchi (Pisa: ETS,
2012).
2 Cf. Bruno Nardi, Studi su Pietro Pomponazzi (Florence: Le Monnier, 1965), 322–29,
380–82; Giovanni Papuli, ‘‘Benedetto Varchi: logica e poetica,’’ in Studi in onore di Anto-
nio Corsano (Manduria: Lacaita, 1970), 527–72; Eugenio Garin, ‘‘Benedetto Varchi e la
teoria dell’eterno ritorno,’’ in Umanesimo e Rinascimento. Studi offerti in onore di Paul
Oskar Kristeller (Florence: Olschki, 1980), 155–72; Paolo Cherchi, ‘‘Due lezioni di
Benedetto Varchi ispirate da J. L. Vives,’’ Lettere Italiane 40 (1988): 387–99; Selene
Ballerini, ‘‘Benedetto Varchi aristotelico ficiniano,’’ Misure critiche 21 (1991): 25–42;
Cesare Vasoli, ‘‘Benedetto Varchi e i filosofi,’’ Benedetto Varchi 1503–1565, ed. Vanni
Bramanti (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2007), 403–34.
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Furthermore, such studies are based for the greater part on the philosophi-
cal fragments published in the nineteenth-century editions of Varchi’s
works, the reliability of which has been questioned by the latest philological
investigations.3 None of them consider the mountain of unedited manu-
script material which is to be found in the Filze Rinuccini of the Biblioteca
Nazionale Centrale (hereafter BNC) in Florence. This oversight has led to
a misleading image of Varchi as an amateur philosopher. Yet much of Var-
chi’s life was spent poring over philosophical texts, in particular those of
logic, ethics, and natural philosophy, and discussing complex philosophical
problems such as the immortality of the soul, animal generation, and the
structure of the universe. The secrets of philosophy were revealed to Varchi
at an early age in the school of the Neoplatonist Francesco Verino the Elder
(1474–1541). His knowledge of Aristotelian psychology was then fostered
by the philosophical debates at the University of Padua and at the Accade-
mia degli Infiammati. He then moved to Bologna where he followed the
lectures of his beloved teacher Ludovico Boccadiferro (1482–1545), before
becoming in 1543 one of the leading figures of the Accademia Fiorentina
under the patronage of Duke Cosimo I.
A reassessment of Varchi’s impact must rest upon a solid understand-
ing of his thought within a context of intellectuals that included the likes of
Cardinal Gasparo Contarini (1483–1542), Sperone Speroni (1500–1588)
and Ludovico Beccadelli (1501–72), whose purpose, in the age of the
Counter-Reformation, was to popularize Aristotle’s doctrines and reconcile
them with Christian religion. Above all, this new appraisal is possible only
by means of a full-fledged investigation of Varchi’s manuscript writings on
psychology, which I shall begin here. Varchi’s manuscripts reveal the depth
of his familiarity with philosophy and his originality as a thinker, especially
with regard to his personal reinterpretation of the ancient Greek commen-
tators of Aristotle. In particular, I wish to show that Varchi was not an
Averroist, as is often claimed on the basis of his Dante lectures, if by Aver-
roism one means, to cite a recent formulation, ‘‘the attribution to Aristotle
of Averroes’s doctrine of the unity of the agent and possible intellects for
all men and therefore the denial of the immortality of the individual human
soul.’’4 This is particularly important in contexts such as Padua and Bolo-
gna, Italy’s two main centers of scholarly philosophical study where Varchi
3 Cf. Annalisa Andreoni, ‘‘Questioni e indagini per l’edizione delle ‘Lezioni accademiche,’ ’’
Benedetto Varchi 1503–1565, ed. Vanni Bramanti (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Lettera-
tura, 2007), 1–24.
4 John Monfasani, ‘‘The Averroism of John Argyropoulos and His ‘Quaestio utrum intel-
lectus humanus sit perpetuus,’ ’’ I Tatti Studies in the Italian Renaissance 5 (1993): 165.
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spent a number of his formative years. In both places it seemed to many
that no one could be truly Aristotelian or even a philosopher if he did not
first embrace Averroes’s doctrines.5
In these manuscript writings, Varchi rejects Averroistic doctrines and
seeks to reconcile Aristotelian psychology with the truth of religion. In so
doing, Varchi appropriates the interpretation of Aristotle offered by Them-
istius (fourth century ce) through the filter of the writings of Marcantonio
Zimara (ca. 1460–1532), an exegesis that allows him to defend the immor-
tality of the human soul while safeguarding the doctrines of Christian faith.
Zimara, along with Pietro Pomponazzi (1462–1525), was one of the fore-
most Aristotelians of the time owing to his comprehensive knowledge of
Aristotle and Averroes. As he himself admits, Varchi’s treatment of psychol-
ogy is based on Zimara’s Theoremata seu memorabilium propositionum
limitationes (1523) and Tabula dilucidationum in dictis Aristotelis et Aver-
rois (1539).6 I will argue that Varchi became acquainted with Aristotelian
psychological doctrines prior to his arrival in Bologna, so his time there
would thus appear to be less decisive than was previously thought for his
philosophical development. This manuscript material should be examined
together with Varchi’s lectures on Dante, which are a genuine companion
to Aristotelian psychology rather than an exercise in literary criticism, as
one might be led to believe.
What makes Varchi’s psychological writings so remarkable is that they
are a part of his project to vernacularize the entire corpus of Aristotelian
philosophy, which included, as he reveals to his friend Piero Vettori, his
unfinished translations of Aristotle’s logical and ethical corpora.7 Modern
surveys of the question of the immortality of the soul in the Renaissance
give scarce, if any, attention to works in the vernacular, since initially the
problem was discussed mainly in Latin among university professors and
men of religion. Yet parallel to the Latin debate there was a conspicuous
number of vernacular works which deserve attention for their various
approaches to this momentous problem.8 Some sought to reconcile rational
5 This was the opinion of Gasparo Contarini, a key figure at the time, cf. Giovanni Di
Napoli, L’immortalita` dell’anima nel Rinascimento (Turin: Societa` Editrice Internazio-
nale, 1963), 278.
6 Benedetto Varchi, Opere (O) (Trieste: Lloyd Austriaco, 1859), 2: 657. On Zimara’s
psychological doctrines cf. Alba Paladini, Il pensiero psicologico e gnoseologico di Marco
Antonio Zimara (Lecce: Congedo, 2001), 114–56.
7 Cf. British Library, Add. Ms. 10273, cc. 223r–4r. On vernacular Aristotelianism, cf.
David A. Lines, ‘‘Rethinking Renaissance Aristotelianism: Bernardo Segni’s Ethica, the
Florentine Academy, and the Vernacular in Sixteenth-Century Italy,’’ Renaissance Quar-
terly 3 (2013): 824–65.
8 So far, I have compiled a list of 16 original works, both in manuscript and printed form.
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arguments with the truths of faith, while others dealt with the problem of
immortality only according to rational arguments in contrast to religion;
others still argued solely in favor of theological positions. Many originally
aimed to reconcile Platonism and Aristotelianism with reference to ancient
Greek commentators, while most connected problems of speculative philos-
ophy, such as the existence of separate intelligences, with moral issues like
happiness and virtue. These vernacular writings were not merely vehicles
for popularizing a debate carried on elsewhere in Latin, but were in their
own right serious contributions to the debates.
Varchi’s vernacular treatises provide precious insights into his own
philosophical thought; yet they also open up an important chapter in this
hitherto neglected area of Renaissance studies. They provide a more
nuanced understanding of the problem of the immortality of the soul, and
also of the social locations of its discussion. These vernacular texts move
the issue beyond the Latin circles of the universities and religious orders
into the courts and academies, such as the Accademia degli Infiammati in
Padua and the Accademia Fiorentina. A particularly striking aspect of Var-
chi’s attempt to translate and popularize knowledge is that he did not limit
himself to passively receiving and transmitting Aristotelian philosophy, as
did many other Aristotelians of the time, in particular those who wrote in
the vernacular. Rather, he was actively engaged in reformulating ideas with
a view to adapting philosophical material to his intended audience, which
consisted mainly of men of letters, academics, and women.9 This approach
did not necessarily involve a simplification of knowledge, but it did involve
widespread dissemination throughout all cultural levels of society.10
Varchi’s psychological writings are now kept in BNC Rinuccini folder
II.VIII.136, which contains a variety of treatises in the vernacular lan-
guage.11 Since they are not autograph manuscripts, it is not always easy to
determine their exact nature; about their authorship, however, there is no
question, since Varchi refers to treatises contained in this folder in some of
his letters.12 They may be preparatory notes for his lectures, or abstracts
9 Cf. Luca Bianchi, ‘‘Volgarizzare Aristotele: per chi?,’’ Freiburger Zeitschrift fu¨r Philoso-
phie und Theologie 59 (2012): 480–95.
10 Cf. O, 2: 490.
11 (1) Divisione dell’anima (27r–33v), which contains (a) Dell’anima vegetativa (29r–
29v); (b) Dell’anima sensitiva (29v–30v); (c) Dell’anima intellettiva (30v–33v); (2) Delle
sensazioni (35v–42r), which contains (a) Del senso (36v–37v); (b) Della sensazione (37v–
38r); (c) Del sensorio (38r–38v); (d) Del sensibile (38v–41r); (e) Del mezzo (41r–42r);
(3) De sensi interiori (43r–46r), which contains (a) Del senso comune (43v–44r); (b)
Della fantasia (44v–45r); (c) Della cogitativa (45r–45v); (d) Memoria (45v–46r); (e) Del
luogo ovvero de i sensi interiori (46r–47r); (4) Dell’intellezione (48r–51v).
12 Cf. Andreoni, ‘‘Questioni e indagini per l’edizione delle ‘Lezioni accademiche,’ ’’ 16.
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from them, or even, as seems more plausible, a companion to Aristotelian
philosophy transcribed by one of his followers, Lelio Bonsi.13 Despite being
distinct works, however, they show a continuity that suggests that Varchi
did indeed intend to compose an overall work on those issues, which were
traditionally related to the exposition of Aristotle’s De anima, and to which
collectively they constitute a reasonably comprehensive commentary.
II. CONTEXT
In order to understand Varchi’s psychological conceptions and his attitude
towards these philosophical problems, we must turn first to debates sur-
rounding the soul in the Renaissance, a topic that has received wide cover-
age in the recent past.14 By the end of the fifteenth century, we find at least
four different schools of thought. The first, held by authors such as Thomas
Aquinas (1225–74), supports the idea of the personal immortality of the
soul and its philosophical demonstrability. The second, maintained by
Averroes, argues that there are two separate intellects, the possible and the
agent, both immortal and unique to all human beings. The third position,
upheld by Marsilio Ficino (1433–99) and the Renaissance Platonists, main-
tains that the human soul has a separate life and independent destiny from
the body, since every human being is endowed with a natural appetite that
induces it to return to its divine origins, to the celestial homeland. The
fourth and most recent position, following the rediscovery of the ancient
Greek commentators of Aristotle, follow Alexander of Aphrodisias (third
century ce), who supports the view that the human soul is mortal and that
only the agent intellect, identified with God, is immortal.
In the last quarter of the fifteenth century, these four positions were the
13 The handwriting is the same as that of the manuscript Accademia dei Lincei, Corsini
1352 (44 G 8–9) containing Varchi’s Storie fiorentine, transcribed by Bonsi, cf. Anna
Siekiera, ‘‘Benedetto Varchi,’’ in Autografi dei letterati italiani. Il Cinquecento (Rome:
Salerno, 2009), 343. I thank Dario Brancato for his suggestion.
14 Cf. E´tienne Gilson, ‘‘Autour de Pomponazzi. Proble´matique de l’immortalite´ de l’aˆme
en Italie au de´but du XVIe sie`cle,’’ Archives d’histoire doctrinale et litte´raire du Moyen
Aˆge 26 (1961): 163–279; Eckhard Kessler, ‘‘The Intellective Soul,’’ The Cambridge His-
tory of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. Charles B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner, and Eckhard
Kessler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 485–534; Paul R. Blum, ‘‘The
Immortality of the Soul,’’ in The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Philosophy, ed.
James Hankins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 211–33; Eckhard Kess-
ler, Alexander of Aphrodisias and his Doctrine of the Soul: 1400 Years of Lasting Signifi-
cance (Leiden: Brill, 2011).
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subject of heated debate, especially at the Universities of Padua and Bolo-
gna. The Parisian Condemnation of E´tienne Tempier (d. 1279) in 1277 did
not deter Averroistic readings of Aristotle,15 which on the contrary, espe-
cially in Padua, became extremely popular through the writings of authors
such as Nicoletto Vernia (1420–99) and Agostino Nifo (c. 1469–1538).16
In reaction to the propagation of Averroistic doctrines, on May 4, 1489,
the Bishop of Padua, Pietro Barozzi (1441–1507), issued an edict against
debating the problem of the unity of the intellect in public (publice dispu-
tare), namely in churches and public squares during solemn events in the
presence of authorities and large audiences. The edict, however, did not
affect lectures in the classrooms of the universities, with the result that
Averroistic doctrines continued to be taught and disseminated.17
A more general condemnation came during the Fifth Lateran Council
on December 19, 1513, with Leo X’s bull Apostolici regiminis sollicitudo.
The historical genesis of the bull is controversial, but recent scholar-
ship suggests that in all probability a significant factor was Renaissance
Platonism—a current of thought that influenced Varchi’s position too.18 In
general, the bull has been variously viewed as a condemnation of the Aver-
roist and Alexandrist doctrine of the soul, a declaration of the individual
immortality of the human soul, or a condemnation of the so-called doctrine
of the double truth.19 Not all the members of the commission of the Apos-
tolici regiminis were in agreement with the bull’s prescriptions, however:
Cardinal Cajetan (1469–1534), for example, disapproved of ‘‘the second
part of the bull, which commands philosophers to teach, and publicly to
persuade of, the truth of faith.’’20 In his various works, Cajetan argued that
15 Cf. Luca Bianchi, Il vescovo e i filosofi: La condanna parigina del 1277 e l’evoluzione
dell’aristotelismo scolastico (Bergamo: Lubrina, 1990); Luca Bianchi, ‘‘1277: A Turning
Point in Medieval Philosophy?,’’ Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?, ed. Jan A. Aertsen
and Andreas Speer (Berlin and New York: Walter De Gruyter, 1998), 90–110.
16 Cf. Edward P. Mahoney, Two Aristotelians of the Italian Renaissance: Nicoletto Vernia
and Agostino Nifo (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000).
17 Cf. Bruno Nardi, Saggi sull’aristotelismo padovano dal secolo XIV al XVI (Florence:
Sansoni, 1958), 155–56.
18 Cf. Paul O. Kristeller, ‘‘The Theory of Immortality in Marsilio Ficino,’’ Journal of the
History of Ideas 1 (1940): 299–319; John Monfasani, ‘‘Aristotelians, Platonists and the
Missing Ockhamists: Philosophical Liberty in Pre-Reformation Italy,’’ Renaissance Quar-
terly 46 (1993): 247–78.
19 Cf. Di Napoli, L’immortalita` dell’anima nel Rinascimento; Eric A. Constant, ‘‘A Rein-
terpretation of the Fifth Lateran Council Decree ‘Apostolici regiminis’ (1513),’’ Sixteenth
Century Journal 33 (2002): 353–76; Luca Bianchi, Pour une histoire de la ‘‘double ve´rite´’’
(Paris: Vrin, 2008).
20 Cf. Gian Domenico Mansi, Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio (Venice:
Zotta, 1773), 843.
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the immortality of the soul found no support in Aristotle’s thesis,21 and that
immortality was not really demonstrated by philosophers; nor did it seem
demonstrable with philosophical arguments in any case, faith alone being
capable of giving us such a certainty.22
Pietro Pomponazzi, in his controversial De immortalitate animae
(1516), established the impossibility of demonstrating the immortality of
the soul with philosophical arguments, while maintaining that the Christian
doctrine of the immortality of the soul could only be accepted on faith. In
his view, revelation offers a kind of certainty of the immortality of the soul
that is not attainable by reason. Even philosophers who have demonstrated
the soul’s mortality rationally can believe in its immortality as a religious
truth. These two separate levels, philosophy and faith, co-exist in Pom-
ponazzi without contradiction, because each has its own field of inquiry.
For Pomponazzi, the religious belief in the immortality of soul in no way
entails the abandonment of reason, and nowhere does he assert the superi-
ority of the truth of reason over the truth of faith; rather he treats them as
two distinct standpoints concerning different matters.23 His arguments were
highly controversial, however, and were harshly criticized by both philoso-
phers and men of religion. The controversy was to occupy philosophical
debate for over half a century, and was very present in Varchi’s mind.24 This
complex and variegated scenario, with its acrimonious dialogue between
philosophy and religion, provides the setting in which we must understand
Varchi’s psychological ideas and his attempt to reconcile rational argu-
ments with the truths of faith.
III. THE DIVISION OF THE SOUL AND
THE CONTAINMENT THESIS
The first manuscript treatise, entitled Divisione dell’anima, offers a general
introduction to Aristotelian psychology. Varchi begins by identifying man’s
position in the cosmos in relation to all other living beings. He claims that
21 Cf. Thomas De Vio, Commentaria De anima Aristotelis (Rome: Angelicum, 1938),
57–58.
22 Cf. Thomas De Vio, Parabolae Salomonis (Rome: Blado, 1542), 117–18. Cf. Antonio
Petagine, ‘‘Aristotelismo e immortalita` dell’anima. La proposta di Tommaso d’Aquino,’’
Lo Sguardo 5 (2011): 1–19.
23 Cf. Vittoria Perrone Compagni, ‘‘Introduzione,’’ in Pietro Pomponazzi, Trattato sul-
l’immortalita` dell’anima (Florence: Olschki, 1999), XCIII.
24 Cf. Martin Pine, Pietro Pomponazzi: Radical Philosopher of the Renaissance (Padua:
Antenore, 1986), 124–234.
PAGE 7
7
................. 18669$ $CH1 12-24-14 07:53:53 PS
JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS ✦ JANUARY 2015
the species of living beings are like numbers: they are infinite, different from
each other, and of varying degrees of perfection. The diversity of living
beings results from the fact that even if nature always tries to do its best,
sometimes it is prevented from doing so by accident and fails to attain its
original goal.25 Perfection is possible only when from brute matter the
noblest thing that can be drawn from it is obtained. Among the material
things, no doubt the noblest ‘‘down from the heaven of the Moon’’ is the
human being. Its nobility and perfection are determined by its form, namely
its intellect, or rational soul, ‘‘which encloses and contains in itself all the
other souls.’’26
This concept of containment of a soul in the others is fundamental to
understanding Varchi’s psychology, because the rational soul becomes the
final form of all other souls, or rather of all the other parts or faculties of
the soul. In another passage, Varchi writes that the vegetative soul is con-
tained in the sensitive soul, in the same way as the triangle is contained in
the square.27 This analogy derives from Aristotle’s De anima 2.3 414 b
31–32, where it is established that ‘‘living beings constitute a series, each
successive term of which potentially contains its predecessor, for instance
the square the triangle, sensory power, the self-nutritive power.’’ This con-
ception of ‘‘containment,’’ which played a central role in Themistius’s
Paraphrasis to Aristotle’s De anima, at least two different editions of which
Varchi had in his library,28 is particularly well developed, and owes its pop-
ularity to Zimara’s Tabula.29 At the heart of Themistius’s interpretation of
the soul, there is on the one hand the identification of the Aristotelian con-
cept of ‘‘form’’ and the Platonic notion of ‘‘idea,’’ on the other the concep-
tion that matter is an indeterminate receptacle, which must be formed by
God so that it can exist and be known. The process of determining and
forming matter by means of the form is manifold. At the beginning there are
the four primitive elements that constitute the basic structures of inanimate
bodies, which are in potency organic bodies characterized by a vegetative
25 Cf. Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze, II.VIII.136 (V), 27r.
26 V, 27v.
27 V, 28v.
28 Cf. Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze, II.VIII.142, 56v. It is possible to identify
these two books as the Libri paraphraseos Themistii Peripatetici acutissimi, published by
Ermolao Barbaro for the first time in 1499, and the same work edited by Barbaro but
with the Contradictiones ac solutiones Marci Antonii Zimarae in dictis lucidissimi Them-
istii, published by Scoto in 1542.
29 Cf. Marcoantonio Zimara, Tabula dilucidationum in dictis Aristotelis et Averrois (Ven-
ice: Scoto, 1537), 17v: ‘‘Non per aliam formam homo est vivens, et per aliam est animal,
vegetativum enim est in sensitivo, sicut trigonum in tetragono. . . .’’
PAGE 8
8
................. 18669$ $CH1 12-24-14 07:53:54 PS
Sgarbi ✦ Benedetto Varchi
soul. The vegetative soul is the actuality of inorganic bodies, but it is in
potency the sensitive soul. The sensitive soul is the form and the actuality
of the vegetative soul. In the most perfect animals, imagination is the form
of the sensitive soul, and it is in potency the possible intellect. Possible intel-
lect is in potency the agent intellect, which is conversely the form and the
actuality of the former. From prime matter to agent intellect there is a chain
of forms, each of which is the perfection and the actuality of what precedes
and the potency and subject of what follows.30 Varchi follows Themistius
in maintaining that before dealing with the rational soul it is necessary to
consider ‘‘not only how many are the souls, but also the levels of life, and
all their powers.’’31 Thus it is possible to reconstruct the whole chain of the
forms of the soul and their various relations.
In general, the ‘‘souls’’ are three: ‘‘the first one and the less perfect of
them is called vegetative, the second sensitive, the third and last intellec-
tual.’’32 Varchi points out that, according to the theologians, all three souls
are one single soul; they are in fact the same soul, one contained in the
others. In the unity of the soul—Varchi states—‘‘we, Christians, must
believe,’’ as do many other pagan philosophers.33 This means that the soul
is always one single entity, but it is virtually and logically separated in its
functions and operations. Varchi is clearly referring to Aristotle’s De anima
2.2 413 b 2, where the Stagirite establishes only a rational or logical distinc-
tion among these souls (τω δ λγω 
τι τερα), supporting its indivisibility
as a form of the body. This first reference to theologians is quite significant
because it shows Varchi’s concern with following Christian doctrine, even
though he adds that it is a truth not only of faith, but also of reason, since
a number of philosophers, including some pagans, agree with this idea.
Furthermore, Varchi makes it clear from the outset that he is not endorsing
the Averroistic standpoint, which maintained that the possible and agent
intellects were two substances separate from each other and from the body;
that is, from the vegetative and sensitive souls. For this reason, for the sake
of the indivisibility of the soul, Varchi also attacks the most naı¨ve of Pla-
tonic positions, according to which souls are not distinguished only by
operations, but also by the place where they are located and operate: the
vegetative soul, which Plato calls also concupiscible, was located in the
liver; the sensitive soul, also called irascible, in the heart; the rational soul
30 Cf. Themistius, Themistii in libros Aristotelis de anima paraphrasis (Berlin: Heinze,
1899), 98–105.
31 V, 27v–28r.
32 V, 28r.
33 Ibid.
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in the brain. The greatest error of the Platonists and Averroists, according
to the theologians, was the breaking up the unity of the soul, which on the
contrary had to be defended, and the impossibility of explaining the recip-
rocal relationships among the various parts of the soul.
But while Varchi rejects the Platonic and Averroistic doctrines of the
soul, he offers from the very beginning of his treatise a particular interpreta-
tion of the Aristotelian doctrine of the soul. He maintains, in line with the
‘‘Peripatetic sect,’’ but in apparent contradiction with what he had stated
previously about the unity of the human soul, that in the human being
there are two distinct souls: ‘‘the sensitive soul, which is generable, and thus
mortal, and the rational soul, which is ingenerated and thus immortal.’’34
Varchi shares this opinion with his teacher Boccadiferro, whose lectures on
the immortality of the soul (collected in Vatican Library, Vat. Lat. 4710)
state that ‘‘in the human being there are two separate souls, the rational
and the sensitive. Thus Themistius argues in 3 De anima, ch. 33, in his
beautiful digression.’’35 Themistius’s position was particularly popularized
by Zimara’s Tabula.36 In this case, Varchi is following Themistius’s inter-
pretation, though not necessarily via Boccadiferro, as had been suggested
by Bruno Nardi and Umberto Pirotti.37 For we can also find this doctrine
of the separation of the two souls in Varchi’s lecture Sur un sonetto del
Bembo (1540) delivered at the Accademia degli Infiammati well before his
stay in Bologna and his acquaintance with Boccadiferro.38 From the very
beginning of his treatise, Varchi offers a particular interpretation of the
Aristotelian doctrine of the soul in which he establishes a distinction
between the sensitive and the rational soul. This is of the utmost importance
if he is to save the immortal character of the human soul, but at the same
time he supports the idea of the unity of the human soul according to faith
34 V, 28r–28v: ‘‘Ma noi che seguitiamo la setta Peripatetica, diciamo che nell’huomo sono
due anime distinte realmente. La sensitiva, la quale e` generabile, e conseguentemente
mortale; e la razionale, la quale e` ingenerata, e conseguentemente immortale.’’
35 Cf. Vat. Lat. 4710, ff. 251v–252r: ‘‘. . . iuditio meo, omnium dictorum, qui est talis,
quod in homine sint duae animae realiter seiunctae, scilicet rationalis et sensitive. Et iste
modus est Themistii in 3 De anima, cap. 33, in illa pulcra digressione de hoc. . . .’’
36 Cf. Zimara, Tabula dilucidationum in dictis Aristotelis et Averrois, 74r: ‘‘Intellectus
enim duplex apud Aristotelem et Theophrastum est, unus patibilis, et corruptibilis, quem
communem illi vocant, et corpore non abiunctum: alter autem totum id quod ex intellectu
agente et intellectu potentiae componitur, quem et separatum a` corpore et incorruptibi-
lem, et ingenitum statuunt. Them. 3 de Anima cap. 39.’’
37 Cf. Nardi, Studi su Pietro Pomponazzi, 322–36; Pirotti, Benedetto Varchi e la cultura
del suo tempo, 67–73. On Varchi’s knowledge of Aristotelian psychology during the
Paduan period, cf. Andreoni, ‘‘ ‘Sangue perfetto che poi non si beve . . .’: Le lezioni di
Benedetto Varchi sul Canto XXV del Purgatorio,’’ Rinascimento 44 (2004): 162.
38 Cf. O, 2: 562–63.
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and theological positions. How is it possible to reconcile these two appar-
ently contradictory positions?
To solve this problem, Varchi starts by examining Aristotle’s definition
of the soul, which is ‘‘first actuality, that is the substantial form of a natural,
organic body, that is non-homogeneous or composed by different parts,
that is potentially alive.’’39 This definition, according to Varchi, ‘‘besides
being very difficult to understand, it is not unambiguous which, as we have
said, a true definition must be—but analogous,’’40 does not explain the vari-
ous relations among the parts of the soul, and does not give an account of
its unity and immortality. For this reason, in Varchi’s view, it is better to
consider Aristotle’s second definition of the soul, conceived by its opera-
tions, as the ‘‘principle through which we live, sense, move and under-
stand.’’41 It is according to these faculties that the soul must be investigated.
IV. SENSITIVE SOUL
In general, as already noted, Varchi recognizes three main faculties of the
soul: vegetative, sensitive, and rational. Varchi’s treatment of the vegetative
and sensitive soul, which is barely more than a summary of the main Aristo-
telian doctrines of the time, is not particularly original.42 The most innova-
tive part is perhaps his reconstruction of the internal senses in the treatise
Delle sensazioni. The internal senses are common sense, the imagination
(or phantasy), the cogitative faculty (or discourse), and memory, their pecu-
liarity being that they receive the sensible from the external senses, ‘‘but
they can work [also] in absence of sensibles.’’43 The most interesting inter-
nal senses are the imagination and the cogitative faculty. The imagination
always works without sensibles, and can be of two kinds: either perfect,
which works by means of memory and species to acquire knowledge, and
is typical of perfect animals; or imperfect, which is nothing other than a
confused sense typical of imperfect animals, and which we can find some-
times also in human beings. In the former case, the imagination is the fac-
ulty that divides and composes ideas; for Varchi, therefore, it seems capable
39 V, 28v. Cf. Aristotle, De anima 2.1 412 a 27.
40 V, 29r.
41 Ibid.
42 On the analysis of the sensitive soul, see the Dichiarazione sopra la seconda parte del
XXV Canto del Purgatorio, now in Andreoni, ‘‘ ‘Sangue perfetto che poi non si beve. . .’,’’
182–223.
43 V, 30r. Varchi’s treatment of the internal senses is heavily based on Zimara’s Tabula.
Cf. Zimara, Tabula dilucidationum in dictis Aristotelis et Averrois, 139r–158v.
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of reasoning. It is noteworthy for Varchi that Aristotle in De anima 2
seemed to identify the imagination with passive intellect, a view the Floren-
tine thinker supports in all his psychological treatises.44 Varchi writes:
This possible intellect can understand nothing that has not [pre-
viously] been in one of the five senses; this because it requires
phantasms, that is species, and forms retained in the imagination
and in the memory. This is what the Philosopher meant when he
stated: and it is necessary that one understand and speculate phan-
tasms; and because one cannot understand anything that is not
universal; therefore, the understanding of singular and particular
things is conjoined with sensation, that is the imagination or cogi-
tative faculty.45
Varchi not only identifies the passive intellect with the imagination, but
also the imagination with the cogitative faculty, or discourse. The cogitative
faculty differs from the imagination only in that the latter abstracts solely
from the presence of sensibles, while the former also from the accidents of
sensibles, such as time and place, forming arguments and thoughts. In
short, the cogitative faculty strips ‘‘individuals of all accidents’’;46 it trans-
forms particular and individual things into general and common things and
serves them to the intellect.47 The imagination as cogitative faculty ‘‘is also
called intellect, but passive, and always serves and administers [phantasms]
to the intellect.’’48
A closer look at Aristotle’s text itself, however, reveals that the Stagirite
never identified the imagination with the passive intellect in the way that
Varchi understood it. This suggests that Varchi is in some way simplifying
Themistius’s interpretation of Aristotle. In De anima 1.4 408 b 26–29,
Aristotle questions whether ‘‘thinking, loving, and hating are affections not
of the intellect, but of that which has intellect, so far as it has it.’’ The
answer is that when this subject decays, memory, hate, and love cease.
Therefore, Aristotle writes, ‘‘they were activities not of mind, but of the
44 Cf. V, 44v: ‘‘e` ancora da notare che qu[e]sta virtu` fu chiamata da Arist. nel 2. Dell’a-
nima, intelletto passibile.’’
45 V, 32v.
46 V, 45v.
47 V, 57v.
48 V, 32v: ‘‘La quale si chiama intelletto anch’ella, ma passivo, e sempre serve, e sommini-
stra all’intelletto.’’
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composite [τ κινν] which has perished’’; indeed the intellect is ‘‘some-
thing more divine and impassible [ δ νυς θειτερν τι κα παθς].’’
For unknown reasons, as Nardi has correctly noted, Themistius’s interpre-
tation of this passage is somewhat wrong, since he reads common intellect
(τυ κινυ νυ) instead of composite (τ κινν). Specifically, Themistius
seems to have understood Aristotle as if τυ κινυ was the masculine geni-
tive referable to νυς, rather than the neuter genitive τ κινν, which
refers to the composite.49 Themistius grounds his theory of common intel-
lect on this misinterpretation. In his view it nothing other than the imagina-
tion, and he equates it with Aristotle’s passive intellect ( δ παθητικς
νυς φθαρτς). Varchi’s main source on Themistius is probably Zimara’s
Tabula, in which he makes it clear that in the De anima 2 Aristotle deals
with the cogitative faculty, and that the interpreters erroneously translate
δινια with intellect, an error of identification that Themistius commits
too.50
The possible intellect, Varchi asserts following Aristotle, is like a
‘‘white table in which nothing is written, but is apt to receive all forms of
all things’’ from the imagination.51 For this reason, the possible intellect can
be considered a passive faculty, because it consists in receiving the intelligi-
bles, just as sensation is a passive faculty because it consists in receiving
sensibles. The reception of these intelligibles is properly called ‘‘intellect-
ion.’’ There are three elements that characterize intellection: (1) the faculty,
that is the intellect; (2) the things to be understood, the intelligibles, in other
words, which are nothing other than ‘‘the species retained in memory and
called phantasms’’;52 (3) agent intellect, which abstracts from phantasms,
transforming them from material and singular to immaterial and universal,
allowing an understanding of universals in actuality, where before it was
only in potency.
49 Cf. Bruno Nardi, ‘‘Introduzione,’’ in Tommaso D’Aquino, Trattato sull’unita` dell’intel-
letto (Florence: Sansoni, 1947), 22; Bruno Nardi, Naturalismo e Alessandrismo nel
Rinascimento (Brescia: Torre d’Ercole, 2012), 135.
50 Cf. Zimara, Tabula dilucidationum in dictis Aristotelis et Averrois, 10v: ‘‘Aristotelis
in 2 de Anima text. Com. 27. Ubi adverte quod textus graecus habet dianoticon, ubi
communiter interpretes trastulerunt intellectivum, sed vere cogitativum dicitur: nam dia-
noea est in parte sensitiva . . . unde animadverte quod inter potentias animae quae simul
sunt in eadem essentia coniunctae, intellectus particularis qui dicitur passivus 2 de Anima
coniungitur in homine cum aliis potentiis minus perfectis . . . Inquit enim lucidissimus
Themistius in commento super libro de Memoria et reminiscentia li. 2 cap. 14 Dianoea
nihil aliud est quam cum imaginatione actio intellectus coniuncta.’’
51 V, 31v.
52 V, 48r.
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Varchi points out that without the imagination, the intellect cannot
receive material to understand, stressing that it is only by accident, through
the imagination, that the intellect can understand particulars, because usu-
ally it apprehends only universals. In fact, while sensation receives merely
singulars and accidents, such as colors, the intellect receives the essence, the
substance and the universal.
Insofar as their objects are substances and universals, all intellects and
rational souls of all human beings in their actuality are, for Varchi, in a
certain sense, the same. If this were not the case, it would be impossible to
explain the presence of common universal concepts in all human beings, or
for that matter their capacity to understand and communicate with each
other. In fact, when two people talk to each other on the same subject,
either they understand one another or they do not; when they do under-
stand the same thing, their act is the same and therefore in a certain sense
the substance of the intellect is the same for the both of them. This happens
only in the understanding, that is, when intelligibles are understood by the
action of the agent intellect. This is an important conception that will lead
Varchi to maintain a particular idea of the uniqueness of the agent intellect,
but not, as we shall see, of the possible intellect.
What distinguishes the various singular intellects are the means and
the tools without which they cannot understand and acquire knowledge,
specifically external and internal senses.53 There is always an individual dis-
position of each particular mind behind the acquisition of knowledge, and
Varchi uses an interesting comparison to explain it:
no operations, whether material or spiritual, can be carried out if
the agent and the possible intellects do not touch each other;
whereby, as God works by means of heavens and heavens by
means of light and movement, in the same way the human soul
does what it does through a means and an instrument, that is by
means of spirits.54
Spirits are generated according to Varchi from the thinnest part of the
blood; thus he who has the best blood also has the best wit. Blood is pro-
duced in the liver and is perfected in the heart, hence the possibility of
having a good wit. The weakness of the power of the soul depends on these
spirits and nothing else. Despite their controversial and ambiguous nature,
53 Cf. V, 50r–v.
54 V, 51r–v.
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spirits for Varchi pertain to the sensitive soul and serve to prepare the possi-
ble intellect, which is, as we have seen, the imagination in actuality and the
agent intellect in potency. Since the disposition of the spirits depends on
sensation, the possible intellect, being the imagination in actuality, is natu-
rally determined by them. The possible intellect relies upon this spiritual
and sensible substratum, which is specific and proper to each individual. In
this way, for Varchi, each particular being has its own specific intellect.
V. RATIONAL SOUL
At the beginning of his short treatise, Dell’anima intellettiva, Varchi states
that the rational soul can be conceived of as divided ‘‘mainly into two parts;
it is not that the soul, which is indivisible, has parts, but it is considered as
having parts, namely powers, virtues, and faculties, because saying so we
are more easily understood.’’55 These two ‘‘parts’’ are specifically the possi-
ble intellect and the agent intellect, which in the human being constitute the
very same rational soul; they are the same thing but, as we shall see, consid-
ered in different ways, one in potency and the other in actuality. On this
particular occasion, Varchi emphasizes once again his alignment with the
theological position establishing the indivisibility of the human soul, even
if we can recognize many faculties within it.
The rest of the treatise is devoted to the examination of these two parts
of the rational soul and their reciprocal relations. The possible intellect,
Varchi points out, ‘‘is a pure and mere potency, which of itself has no
nature, nor proper actuality.’’56 It therefore does not have a real nature, but
is mere virtuality, and has as its own specificity the fact of being in between
the imagination and the agent intellect. In potency, however, the receptivity
of the possible intellect constitutes its perfection, because the more it knows
things the more it becomes perfect, ‘‘so much that by learning them all it
becomes one and the same thing with the agent intellect.’’ Varchi adds that
‘‘in this conjoining of these two intellects, according to the greatest of
Arabs, Averroes, the ultimate perfection and human happiness consist.’’57
And again, in the Dichiarazione sopra que’versi di Dante nel diciassette-
simo canto del Purgatorio (1564), Varchi states:
55 V, 30v–31r: ‘‘L’anima razionale si divide primariamente in due parti; non che l’anima,
la quale e` indivisibile, habbia parti, ma si piglia parti, cioe` potenze, virtu`, e facolta`, e
perche cosı` dicendo siamo meglio intesi.’’
56 V, 31v: ‘‘L’intelletto possibile non e` altro che una pura, e semplice potenza, il quale da
se non ha natura, ne atto nessuno proprio.’’
57 Ibid.
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The greatest miracle of all miracles is that the human being
through the habits of virtues and sciences can conjoin the possible
intellect with the agent intellect, that is make them the same; and,
consequently, that it [the human being] can understand without
reasoning, and thus it is all things no longer in potency, but in
actuality . . . in this conjoining consists, according to the insuffi-
ciently praised Arab, Avenr son of Rois, otherwise known as Alul-
ide Rosaceo [Averroes], the last perfection, and consequently the
highest happiness and human beatitude, since in it one sees, under-
stands and enjoys intuitively and face-to-face the ultimate good.
. . . Only the human being, among all creatures terrestrial and
celestial, has free will, and is capable of virtues and sciences
through which it can . . . conjoin the possible and the agent intel-
lect and become almost like God.58
On the basis of these explicit statements, Nardi considered Varchi an Aver-
roist, but this doctrine is not exclusively Averroistic; nor does a simple ref-
erence to Averroes necessarily determine his standpoint. This is particularly
evident in the manuscript where Varchi refutes the positions of both Alex-
ander of Aphrodisias and Averroes:
This possible or material intellect according to Alexander is mor-
tal, but not for Averroes. It is true that he [Averroes] wants—and
thus it seems necessary according to Aristotle—for the intellect not
to be multiplied, that is that each individual has not his or her own
intellect, but that it is only one for all human beings, which is
contrary to theological truth, and one should not believe in it in
any way.59
Varchi clearly rejects the Averroistic position of the uniqueness of the possi-
ble intellect in favor of theological truth, despite recognizing that by follow-
ing Aristotle it is plausible that there might be only one possible intellect
for all human beings. This means that for Varchi the possible intellect is
proper to each individual human being. In this passage, Varchi is evidently
58 O, 2: 329.
59 V, 31v–32r: ‘‘Questo intelletto possibile, ovvero materiale, secondo Alessandro e` mor-
tale, ma secondo Averrois no. Bene e` vero, che egli vuole, e cosı` par essere necessario,
secondo Arist[otele], che egli non sia multiplicato, cioe` che ciascuno individuo non habbia
il suo, ma sia un solo in tutti gli huomini, la qual cosa e` del tutto contraria alla verita`
teologica, ne si deve credere in verun modo.’’
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following the prescriptions of the Apostolici regiminis, seeking to bring all
Aristotelian doctrines back to the Christian doctrine. In the Dichiarazione
sopra la seconda parte del venticinquesimo canto del Purgatorio (1543), he
states that
of the rational soul it is possible to speak in two ways: according
to human reason and natural discourse, as the gentile philosophers
did; and according to the supernatural light and divine inspiration,
as our Christian theologians did.60
Varchi thus distinguishes two kinds of investigation on the rational soul,
that of the philosophers and that of the theologians. In his view, these two
positions are not necessarily in contrast to one another, although they do
sometimes lead to divergent results. In case of divergence, truths of faith
always take precedence over truths of reason, since one truth cannot con-
tradict another, a point on which Varchi differs from Pomponazzi, who
supported a sharp distinction between philosophy and religion. ‘‘In order
not to occupy unworthily the professions of others,’’61 however, in this case
that of the theologians, he chooses to consider only the philosophical posi-
tions. His purpose is thus ‘‘to follow in all respects Aristotle’s doctrine and
that of his commentators, especially, among the Greeks, the industrious
Philoponus, among Arabs the very learned Averroes, and among the Latins
the very truthful St. Thomas.’’62 Nonetheless, for Varchi, to follow the phil-
osophical approach means to lead Aristotelianism back within the fold of
religion.63
As was the norm in sixteenth-century Aristotelian commentaries, Var-
chi proceeded in his analysis by examining all theories presented by past
philosophers, and in his view there were two main currents of thought on
the soul. Some considered the soul as a body, or a corporeal thing, others
as an immaterial thing. The opinions of those who claimed that the soul
was corporeal were of little value, according to Varchi, and were all ‘‘very
false, not only for the holy Christian law, but also for Aristotle.’’64 Once
again, it was important for Varchi to assert that his position was perfectly
compliant with the dictates of Christian doctrines, as well as aligned with
the veracious ideas of Aristotle.
60 O, 2: 312.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Cf. O, 2: 666, 673.
64 Ibid., 315.
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Against those who believed that the soul was corporeal there were two
factions that upheld the view that the soul was incorporeal. Some philoso-
phers maintained that the soul was separable from the body, and was there-
fore immortal, while others held that the human soul was inseparable from
the body, and was thus mortal. Supporters of the latter thesis were Alexan-
der of Aphrodisias and Galen, and more recently Pietro Pomponazzi, whom
Varchi admired generally,65 but not for his psychological views, which he
knew to be heretical. The thesis of the complete inseparability of the soul
from the body, according to Varchi, was not the correct interpretation
of Aristotle, who in truth ‘‘wants the soul to be substance, not accident;
incorporeal, not corporeal; separable and immortal, not inseparable and
mortal.’’66
Nardi’s conclusion—based on the corrupted text of the 1841 edition—
that Varchi was an Averroist, or perhaps followed Siger of Brabant (c.
1240–82), is erroneous.67 Varchi in fact supports the idea of the immortal-
ity of the soul, along with its only virtual divisibility according to its func-
tions, and its real indivisibility as a single entity in the human being. In
defending the concept of the immortality of the soul, Varchi states that if
all internal senses deal with the body, the rational soul, on the contrary, ‘‘is
not a body, nor a virtue in a body, nor does it require a corporeal instru-
ment, if not by accident’’;68 it can therefore be considered immaterial, and
hence immortal. Thus Varchi promises to explain
four very important and desired doubts for everyone. First:
whether the soul is mortal or immortal. Second: whether the soul
is multiplied in number in such a way that everyone has their own,
or there is only one for all men. Third: whether the soul is a sub-
stantial form of man, and if it gives it the being and the operations,
or does not, and is only an assistant, like the helmsman, who is the
pilot of the boat. Fourth: whether in man there are one or more
souls that are really distinct.69
Unfortunately, the second part of this lecture is missing, but a partial
answer to these questions may be found in the Lezione sopra il primo canto
65 Cf. O, 2: 524.
66 O, 2: 316. In this case I follow Annalisa Andreoni’s forthcoming critical edition of
Varchi’s Lectures, which reads ‘‘separable and immortal, not inseparable and mortal’’
instead of ‘‘inseparable and immortal, not separable and mortal.’’
67 Cf. Nardi, Studi su Pietro Pomponazzi, 324. Nardi used Benedetto Varchi, Lezioni sul
Dante e prose varie (Florence: Societa` Editrice delle Storie del Nardi e del Varchi, 1841).
68 O, 2: 350.
69 Ibid., 321.
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del Paradiso di Dante. Varchi points out that the rational soul is divided
into two faculties: the possible intellect and the agent intellect. Aristotle
also calls the possible intellect ‘‘material,’’ and this, Varchi explains,
not because it is in such manner, being non-mixed and separate in
itself from every matter, but he calls it with such a name because,
as the prime matter that can receive all the sensible forms, and in
relation to all of them is in potency, thus also this intellect can
receive all intelligible things and in relation to all of them is in
potency.70
The possible intellect is further divided into the speculative intellect and the
practical intellect. The speculative, or contemplative, intellect has as its
object universal things, and as its aim the contemplation of truth. The prac-
tical intellect, on the other hand, deals with particular things. Varchi
emphasizes that these two intellects are the same as the possible intellect,
only conceived in different ways and according to different operations and
functions, and again he reiterates the substantial indivisibility of the intel-
lect and the soul. Varchi also characterizes the speculative and practical
intellects by means of Aristotle’s five intellectual virtues, or habits, namely
intelligence, science, wisdom, art, and prudence, and suggests, albeit implic-
itly, that these habits qualify each particular individual possible intellect.71
The agent intellect, on the other hand, is nobler than the possible intel-
lect, and is called that because it can do everything, especially, following
Averroes, transferring things from one order of knowledge to another, thus
making sensible things intelligible. As Varchi writes, the agent intellect does
not make things, ‘‘but it makes possible their understanding.’’72 From Var-
chi’s interpretation of the agent intellect we can deduce his conception of
the soul. What the agent intellect is, according to Varchi, is a matter of
debate:
Alexander [of Aphrodisias] says that it is the first cause, that is the
divine intellect; Philoponus thinks that it is a faculty of the rational
soul; others say that it is a middle substance between divine intel-
lect and the human one, but is neither divine nor human.73
70 Ibid., 351.
71 V, 32r.
72 O, 2: 351.
73 Ibid.
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These are all positions with which he in fact disagrees, maintaining rather
that:
Following Themistius, whose opinion appeared to be more conge-
nial to the mind of Aristotle, according to the estimation of our
teacher [Boccadiferro], we will say that the agent intellect is a fac-
ulty of the soul that is substantially distinct from the possible intel-
lect, so that as the body and the soul result in one single thing, in
the same way from the agent intellect as form and the possible
intellect as matter one single thing is formed, which is the rational
soul.74
Varchi shares Themistius’s view about the agent intellect—against ‘‘Alexan-
der, the noblest Peripatetic,’’ who held that the agent intellect was God—
maintaining a twofold position according to which the agent intellect is in
itself a single separate substance, but as the form of the possible intellect,
which is matter, it constitutes one single rational soul for each individual.
Following Themistius, Varchi believes that the agent intellect is a part of
the soul that is distinguished ‘‘substantially from the possible intellect,
because in each being, where there is something in potency, there is also
something in actuality, which transforms this potency into actuality,
because otherwise this potency would be meaningless, which is not possible
in nature.’’75 The proper task of this agent intellect is therefore ‘‘to make all
intelligible things in potency intelligible things in actuality,’’76 to transform
potency into actuality, just as the light makes visible all things that it is
possible to see. Varchi’s analogy of the agent intellect and light comes from
Aristotle’s De anima 3.5 430 a 10–17, and receives particular emphasis in
Themistius. Themistius writes that when light becomes present in the sight
and in colors that are in potency, it turns them into actuality. Analogously,
the agent intellect joins the possible intellect, acts on it, and acts on the
intelligibles in potency, which are the species produced by the imagination
and stored in the memory, turning them, like colors, into actuality.77 In
74 Ibid.
75 V, 31r: ‘‘. . . noi la crediamo, secondo Aristotile, parte dell’anima distinta sostanzial-
mente dall’intelletto possibile; perche in ciascuno ente, dove e` alcuna cosa come potenza,
si truova ancora alcuna cosa come atto, il quale riduce cotale potenza all’atto; perche
altrame[n]te cotale potenza sarebbe in vano, il che la Natura non patisce.’’
76 Ibid.: ‘‘l’ufficio di questo intelletto agente e` di fare, che tutte le cose intelligibili in
potenza, divengono intelligibili in atto.’’
77 Themistius, Themistii in libros Aristotelis de anima paraphrasis, 103–4.
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other words, the agent intellect, like a light, actualizes both the images in
the soul and the possible intellect.
For both Themistius and Varchi, therefore, the agent intellect is the
form of the possible intellect. But the possible intellect, as we have seen, is
in a certain sense, being its form, identical to the imagination, which is
specific to each individual. The agent intellect thus actualizes the possible
intellect, which is specific to every individual human being. Being the form
of the possible intellect, which is personal and individual, and being, in
accordance to the containment thesis, the summit of the scale and the form
of all previous forms, the agent intellect constitutes the essence of the
human being. As essence, the agent intellect is separate from the individual
human beings, but it is unique and the same for all humankind. The unique-
ness of the agent intellect is necessary for both Themistius and Varchi,
because otherwise, as we have seen, it would be impossible to explain the
presence of common universal concepts in all human beings and their
capacity to understand one another. Such uniqueness, however, does not
prevent the agent intellect from being multiplied in the human beings like
light, which is unique, but makes sight possible for all human beings.78 The
analogy with light is important for Themistius and Varchi, because it allows
them to explain how the agent intellect, although a separate being, can be
located in the soul: ‘‘the agent intellect is in itself one, but it breaks up and
enters different human subjects, just as natural light comes from a single
source and breaks up in the different subjects receiving it.’’79 Varchi’s posi-
tion, following Themistius, differs radically from that of Averroes, as the
Florentine philosopher locates both the possible and agent intellects in the
soul, while the Islamic philosopher conceives both intellects as eternal sub-
stances existing independently of the human soul.80
This idea of the multiplication and irradiation of the agent intellect is
a characteristic element of the Platonic conception of the idea, which,
although universal and unique, is nonetheless capable of becoming the
essence of individual things. Following Themistius,81 but probably accord-
ing to Zimara’s Tabula (of which in this case Varchi’s words seem to be
a translation),82 the Florentine thinker points out that agent and possible
78 Cf. ibid., 103.
79 Herbert A. Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, & Averroes on Intellect. Their Cosmologies,
Theories of the Active Intellect, & Theories of Human Intellect (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1992), 27.
80 Cf. ibid., 319.
81 Themistius, Themistii in libros Aristotelis de anima paraphrasis, 108.
82 Zimara, Tabula dilucidationum in dictis Aristotelis et Averrois, 74r: ‘‘Intellectus agens
et intellectus potentiae, partim duae naturae sunt, partim una. Nam et id quod ex duabus
facultatibus forma, et materia conditur, unum esse intelligimus.’’
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intellects are in one sense two distinct natures, and in another sense the
same nature. The agent intellect is the universal essence of humankind
which, like the Platonic idea, and thanks to the possible intellect, which is
its reverberation in matter, can be communicated to other individuals and
be in them without losing its original and essential uniqueness.
To recapitulate, in Varchi there is only one agent intellect, which is the
form of the lower forms of the soul, the possible intellect in particular. As
the agent intellect, it is in itself unique, but as form, it is irradiated and
divided among all individuals, like light making things visible. The agent
intellect is the form of the possible intellect, and only in the conjunction
between these two intellects, like in the conjunction of matter and form, is it
possible to understand individuality. The compound of these two intellects
constitutes the individual, as well as what he calls the rational soul, which
he views as immortal. The problem now is to understand why for the
Florentine thinker every single human being is, thanks to its rational soul,
immortal. In this case also, Themistius’s interpretation of Aristotle is the
explanation. It is quite clear that the vegetative and sensitive souls perish
with the body, and that the agent intellect, being incorporeal and in actual-
ity, does not. The real question arises concerning the possible intellect,
which is the imagination in actuality and the agent intellect in potency.
According to Varchi, following Themistius, the immortal soul is not the
compound itself of the possible and agent intellects, because the agent intel-
lect is undoubtedly more separable and unmixed with the body than the
possible intellect. When the two intellects become one by conjoining, how-
ever, that is, the rays of light proceeding from the agent intellect enter the
human soul and join the possible intellect, the possible intellect shares the
immortality that pertains by essence to the agent intellect. Now, since
the agent intellect joins the possible intellect at least by the time the human
soul understands intelligibles, the possible intellect, in this conjunction,
must already attain immortality at that time.83 In this way, Varchi is capable
of saving the immortality of the rational soul for every individual human
being.
By endorsing Themistius’s position, Varchi is able to salvage both the
personal immortality and indivisibility of the human soul in accordance
with the doctrine of the Christian theologians, and the Aristotelian posi-
tion, albeit in a form that is mixed with a particular kind of Platonism, and
thereby to remain within the dictates of the papal bull.
83 Cf. Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, & Averroes on Intellect, 40–41.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The study of Varchi’s psychological manuscript treatises reveals a different
image of the Florentine philosopher from the one we are accustomed to
from reconstructions based only on the published Lezioni, which seem to
suggest little more than a faint trace of Averroism. A study of his hitherto
unexamined manuscript works shows a far subtler thinker who cannot eas-
ily be categorized.
Varchi’s position is generally based upon that of Themistius, which is
an eclectic blend of Aristotelianism and Platonism. This allows him to make
a rigorous distinction between theological and philosophical positions
while avoiding lapses into the Averroistic heresy or errors condemned in
the bull, Apostolici regiminis, especially in relation to ideas concerning the
mortality and divisibility of the soul and the uniqueness of the possible
intellect. Varchi cannot be considered an Averroist, whatever that may
mean: he does not accept the uniqueness of the possible intellect, the divisi-
bility of the human soul, the mortality of the individual intellect, or the
identification of the agent intellect with God. Varchi is indeed an eclectic
thinker who represents a fascinating chapter in sixteenth-century psychol-
ogy and vernacular Aristotelianism, not only because his works and ideas
remained and circulated primarily in manuscript form, but also because
they responded to contextual demands and contemporary debates on the
immortality of the soul, showing the high level of philosophical debate in
the vernacular language.84
Universita` Ca’ Foscari, Venice.
84 This research has been possible thanks to the ERC Starting Grant 2013, n. 335949,
‘‘Aristotle in the Italian Vernacular: Rethinking Renaissance and Early-Modern Intellec-
tual History (c. 1400–c. 1650).’’
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